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Abstract
A decision support system (DSS) was devel-
oped to support tactical decision making in
demanding, ambiguous situations. An applied
experiment was conducted to evaluate the ex-
tent to which the DSS contributed to greater
situational awareness. Eight highly experi-
enced CO-TAO teams participated in four
realistic scenarios, two with and two without
the DSS. Decision performance and team
communications were examined. With the
DSS, teams were observed to focus on critical
contacts earlier and to be more likely to take
appropriate action. Teams using the DSS
tended to communicate less, but they com-
municated in a similar pattern and about
similar content regardless of DSS condition.
These findings suggest that such systems can
support decision makers by enabling them to
access key data easily, to visualize the inte-
gral relations among data, and to manage
complex response actions.
1 Introduction
Development of a decision support system
(DSS) was initiated as part of the Navy’s Tactical
Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) proj-
ect in which display concepts derived from current
cognitive theory were evaluated and demon-
strated.   The focus of the DSS has been on en-
hancing the performance of tactical decision mak-
ers (viz., the Commanding Officer (CO) and Tac-
tical Action Officer (TAO) working as a team) for
single ship air defense missions in high density,
ambiguous littoral situations.
Baseline tests in representative littoral sce-
narios suggested that experienced decision makers
were not particularly well served by current sys-
tems [Hutchins et al., 1996a].  Teams exhibited
periodic losses of situation awareness, often
linked with limitations in human memory, prob-
lems of shared attention, and decision biases.
Problems associated with short term memory
limitations included:
• mixing up track numbers (track is recalled as
7003 vs. 7033) and forgetting track numbers;
• confusing or forgetting track kinematic data
(track is recalled as descending vs. ascending
in altitude, closing vs. opening in range, etc.);
• associating past events or actions with the
wrong track number or associating completed
actions with the wrong track number.
Observed problems that were related to decision
biases included:
• carrying an initial threat assessment through-
out the scenario regardless of new informa-
tion;
• assessing a track based on information other
than that associated with the track (e.g., old
intelligence data, assessments of similar
tracks, outcomes of unrelated events, past ex-
periences).
2 Decision Support System Development and
Testing
A prototype DSS was developed with the ob-
jectives of:  (1) minimizing the mismatches be-
tween cognitive processes and the information
available in the CIC to facilitate the decision
making; (2) mitigating the shortcomings of cur-
rent CIC displays which impose high information
processing demands and exceed the limitations of
human memory; and (3) transferring the data in
the current CIC from numeric to graphical pres-
entations wherever appropriate to facilitate the
interpretation of spatial data.  It was determined
that the resultant system should not filter or exten-
sively process data in the manner of a decision aid
because this could reduce the effectiveness of the
decision makers.
2.1 DSS Modules
The prototype DSS and its underlying design
principles have been described in detail elsewhere
[Hutchins et al., 1996b].  Basically, the DSS con-
sists of several separate display modules arranged
as a tiled composite.  The modules in the upper-
half of the display present a variety of kinematic
and status data intended to enable decision makers
to determine quickly what a particular track is
doing and whether any action is required.  An-
other area summarizes the available data in a form
intended to assist decision makers in evaluating a
track’s status.  Presumably, this module would
encourage decision makers to consider everything
that’s known about a track when making an as-
sessment of “threat” vs. “non-threat”.  The lower
portion of the DSS presents an alphanumeric
summary of the highest priority tracks.  This is
intended to support decision makers in allocating
their shared attention across concurrent tracks.
2.2 Research Design
An experiment was conducted to examine the
impact of the DSS on team performance.  Eight
expert Navy tactical decision making teams (with
emphasis on the CO and TAO) used either an
analogue of a current tactical data system alone
(the No DSS condition) or in conjunction with the
prototype DSS (the DSS condition).  Three of the
teams were intact CO-TAO teams from ships.
The others were ad hoc teams of highly experi-
enced officers currently serving on battle group or
type command staffs or as tactics instructors.  All
had had extensive shipboard experience involving
tactical decision making in situations similar to
those examined in this study.
A within-subject factorial design was em-
ployed across four test scenarios such that each
team performed two scenarios with the DSS and
two scenarios without it.  The order of the sce-
narios and DSS conditions were counterbalanced
using a Latin Square.  Criterion-referenced train-
ing with the baseline display system and with the
DSS was provided, and two practice scenarios
were run prior to beginning the test session. In
addition to collecting objective data on tactical
actions, display usage, and voice communications,
subjective assessments (via questionnaires and a
structured interview) were solicited from each CO
and TAO at the conclusion of the test session.
Results indicated no evidence of a practice ef-
fect over the four-scenario test session and no
consistent differences between the scenarios
themselves.  Substantial differences were ob-
served, however, between teams – notably in their
subjective workload assessments and in their
communication rates and patterns.
3 Decision Performance
The results of primary interest concerned the
overall effects of the DSS and its component dis-
play modules on the teams’ decision making.
Two of the measures of decision performance are
discussed here:  recognition of critical contacts
and compliance with the rules of engagement.
3.1 Focus on Critical Contacts
During the scenario runs, the experimenter
probed the CO-TAO team at prespecified times to
identify the tracks that were considered to be of
the greatest tactical interest at that time (i.e., high-
est priority).  The teams’ responses were con-
trasted with those of an independent group of
subject matter experts.  As shown in Figure 1,
more of the critical contacts were identified at the
early and middle probes when the DSS was avail-
able. At the late probe, however, performance was
comparable1.  This effect suggests that the advan-
tage of DSS may disappear late in the scenario
since the critical tracks become more obvious by
that time, even without the DSS.  Another inter-
esting effect is the tendency to report fewer tracks
of interest later in the scenario when using the
DSS.  This could actually reflect a greater situa-
tion awareness, whereby decision makers used the
DSS to evaluate a wide number of contacts and
then chose to concentrate on (and report) only the
unresolved, high priority contacts.  Nevertheless,
earlier recognition of critical tracks is desirable,
since it essentially “buys time” for decision mak-
ers to consider a broader array of response options
and to permit more effective coordination of their
responses.
                                                
1 A 2 x 3 factorial ANOVA found no significant main effects
of DSS, F(1, 88) = 2.77, MSE = 2208, or of Time of Probe,
F(2, 88) = 2.26, MSE = 1797.  The interaction was signifi-
cant, however (F(2, 88) = 3.97, p < .05, MSE = 3159).  Post
hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between
DSS and No DSS runs (p < .05) at the Early and Middle
























Figure 1.  Percent of critical contacts reported as
tracks of interest.
3.2 Adherence to Rules of Engagement
Using the rules of engagement as a benchmark
for decision performance in the scenarios, a group
of subject matter experts assessed whether the
CO-TAO teams warned and/or illuminated threat
tracks at specified times and took appropriate de-
fensive actions.  A modified form of the AAW
Team Performance Index (ATPI) [Dwyer, 1992]
was used for scoring tactical performance, and
these data are summarized in Figure 2.  In sce-
narios when the DSS was available, CO-TAO
teams were significantly more likely to take de-
fensive actions in a timely manner against immi-
nent threats2.  This indicates that the DSS pro-
moted an earlier recognition of the emerging risks
of the tactical situation.  By contrast, no difference
was observed in the number of tracks that were
warned or illuminated when the DSS was avail-
able3.   However, several subject matter experts
contended that warnings and illuminations may
not be valid performance indices since they are
provocative tactical actions that commanders may
consider to be inappropriate against certain tracks
in a littoral situation.  Indeed, if the DSS pro-
moted greater understanding of the intent of am-
biguous tracks, decision makers might be less
willing to issue warnings or to illuminate any but
the most threatening tracks.  This greater under-
standing of the tactical situation would of course
                                                
2 t(15) = 2.27, p < .05
3 Warnings: t(15) = 0.83; Illuminations: t(15) = 0.79




























Figure 2.  Team performance of tactical actions
required by the rules of engagement.
These findings indicate that the DSS contrib-
uted to improved decision performance by the
CO-TAO teams.  In particular, it appears that with
the DSS teams were more aware of the tactical
situation, which in turn promoted an earlier focus
on critical contacts and a greater tendency to take
appropriate defensive actions.
4 Team Communications
It is important to determine whether the DSS
altered the process by which decisions are made
about which actions to take and when to take
them.  On one hand, the decision process may be
external, triggered by the information flow among
the team’s communications.  On the other hand, it
may be internal, whereby decision makers use the
information acquired from the DSS and the team
to recognize patterns of tactical significance. To
explore the locus of the DSS effect, voice com-
munications among the team were examined.
Analyses of the rate, pattern, and content of voice
communications are reported here.
4.1 Communications Rate and Pattern
It was hypothesized that when using the DSS,
teams would have less need to exchange data ver-
bally and would, thus, communicate less often.
To test this, all voice communications that re-
quested or provided information were tabulated
for each of the 32 test runs4.  Since the length of
the scripted test scenarios differed, the total num-
ber of voice communications observed was di-
vided by the scenario duration to give a communi-
cations rate.
Figure 3 shows the mean rate of communica-
tions originating with the CO, TAO, other mem-
bers of their team, and others external to the ship’s
combat center (e.g., the battle group commander,
the bridge).  A general decrease in communica-
tions rate with the DSS may be seen5.  This de-
crease remains fairly consistent regardless of who
originated the communication.  In fact, the pattern
of communications was unaffected by the pres-
ence of the DSS.  About 40% of the communica-
tions occurred between the CO and TAO, and an-
other 35% occurred between the TAO and the
team.  Each of the remaining links accounts for



























Figure 3.  Voice communications rate by message
originator and DSS condition.
A reduction in communications rate was ob-
served when the DSS was available.  It is inter-
esting to note, however, that this reduction was
                                                
4 The scenario time at which the communication began, the
sender, the receiver, the subject track(s), the message type
(request, reply, or provide), and the message content were
coded for each communication.  Acknowledgments and
background communications were not counted.
5 t(15) = 1.82, p < .10
uniform across positions.  This suggests that the
DSS supported the entire team by providing basic
data about tracks, thereby reducing their need to
request or provide such data verbally.
4.2 Communications Content
While the pattern of communications was not
found to be affected by the presence of the DSS,
the content of the teams’ communications may be
altered by the DSS.  That is, without the DSS,
teams might need to spend more time exchanging
basic track data while those with the DSS might
spend the bulk of their time assessing track intent
or evaluating alternate courses of action. To ex-
plore this, voice communications were coded by
their message content according to the following
scheme:
• Information – exchange of sensor-based data;
• Status – exchange of procedure-based data;
• Clarification – communication to elucidate,
interpret, or correct other communications;
• Correlation – association of two or more data;
• Assessment – discussion of expected track be-
havior, likely intent, or future actions;
• Orders – commands to perform an action.
Figure 4 shows the overall average proportion
of communications observed for each of these
content categories.  The largest proportion in-
volved Information communications, in which
sensor-based data were exchanged.  This, of
course, is not surprising since these data effec-
tively drive the decision processes.  The rate of
these communications, however, was found to be
lower when the DSS was available6.  Since the
DSS provides much of these data, there was less
need to exchange it verbally among the team.
Similarly, fewer Correlation communications
were observed when using the DSS7.  Although
decision makers were less likely to ask about or
report correlation data with the DSS (since much
of it is displayed automatically), they were some-
what more likely to talk about correlations in the
data that they observed on the DSS.  No differ-
ences between DSS and No DSS runs were ob-
                                                
6 t(15) = 2.16, p < .05
7 t(15) = 2.09, p  .05








Figure 4.  Mean proportion of communications by
content category.
Overall, about 20% of the communications
were for clarification purposes, reflecting uncer-
tainty about track location, kinematics, identifica-
tion, status, or priority.  When the teams had the
DSS available, fewer communications were aimed
at clarifying the tactical situation, particularly
track kinematics, identification, and priority –
each of which are directly aided by the DSS.  On
the other hand, with the DSS, decision makers
tended to spend more time clarifying ambiguous
communications and checking on the status of ac-
tions.  While this result may seem counterintui-
tive, it reveals a greater situational awareness
where ambiguous, incomplete, or erroneous
communications are more likely to be caught and
corrected when the DSS was available.
The tracks to which the teams’ communica-
tions referred were also examined under the DSS
and the No DSS conditions.  The hypothesis was
that the DSS would enable teams to focus on the
critical contacts more quickly, resulting in a
greater proportion of their communications about
those tracks.  The average proportion of commu-
nications about the critical contacts was slightly
greater (but not significant) when using the DSS9.
It is not particularly surprising that these teams
concentrated the bulk of their communications on
the critical contacts regardless of whether or not
they were using the DSS.  After all, these were
                                                
8 Status: t(15) = 0.07; Clarification: t(15) = 0.85; Assess-
ment: t(15) = 0.72; Orders: t(15) = 0.79.
9 t(15) = 0.96
highly experienced tactical decision makers who
are accustomed to functioning effectively with
their current (non-DSS) systems.  Thus, greater
effects might be obtained with less experienced
decision makers.
4.3 General Discussion of Communications
In reviewing these findings, it appears that
when the DSS was available, teams communi-
cated less often but more efficiently, addressing
key issues in support of their tactical decisions.
Yet, who they communicated with and which
tracks they talked about remained pretty much the
same.
The absence of strong differences in team
communications associated with the DSS suggests
that the key processes are largely internal.  The
DSS presents data in a form that promotes feature
matching by experienced decision makers.  To the
extent that the DSS is a shared display, it also
serves as a mediator for collaboration among the
CO, TAO, and their team – altering the amount
and form of their communications.
It should also be noted that these data were
collected during a very brief exposure to the DSS.
It seems reasonable to expect that the way in
which the DSS is used, and the resultant team
communications, would change as greater experi-
ence was obtained.  A study is currently underway
to examine how extended experience with the
DSS affects decision performance and team com-
munications.
5 Features of Decision Support Systems
These findings reveal several interesting char-
acteristics of tactical decision makers and suggest
features of a DSS that can best support them.  The
communications data indicated that these experi-
enced tactical decision makers knew which data
they needed about which tracks, who to talk with
to get those data, what actions were appropriate to
take, and even which tracks were the ones of
greatest concern.  The major benefits provided by
the DSS were the ease with which it enabled deci-
sion makers to access the data, to visualize the
integral relations among data, and to manage
complex response actions.  These benefits enabled
the CO-TAO team to concentrate more of their
efforts on (higher level) tactical decision proc-
esses since they did not need to spend as much
time on (lower level) information gathering and
correlation.  The primary result of this is the abil-
ity to attend to more critical contacts in greater
depth, as indicated by the decision performance
data.
The design principles associated with these in-
formation processing benefits are illustrated in
various DSS features.  These include easy access
to important track data in a readable format, visu-
alization of track position relative to weapons and
ROE thresholds, and interactive reminders of key
actions that should be considered and when they
should be taken.  In general, these features suggest
that decision support systems can provide sub-
stantial benefits when they reduce the processing
involved in gathering and integrating data from
diverse sources and in managing the status of con-
current, evolving actions on many tracks.
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